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‘The Untimely Historical Sociologist’ 
Forum on Andrew Linklater, Violence and Civilisation in the Western States System 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017) 
Review of International Studies 
June 2017 
 
Abstract 
This article examines the historical sociology that informs Andrew Linklater's Violence 
and Civilisation in the Western States-System. On the sociological side, it critically 
assesses Linklater's use of Elias and Wight, arguing that his 'higher level synthesis' is 
internally incompatible. On the historical side, the article argues that the occlusion of 
the transnational interactions that, in great measure, drive historical development 
means that Linklater's analysis is inadequate for its stated purpose: to chart the 
development of civilising processes within the Western states-system. 
 
Western civilisation? 
When asked by a reporter what he thought of Western civilization, Mahatma Gandhi is 
said to have replied that ‘it would be a good idea’. Apocryphal or not, Gandhi’s remark 
speaks to the ‘dark side’ of Western civilisation: its histories of imperialism and 
colonialism, authoritarianism and racism, genocide and mass warfare. In the 
contemporary world, these histories are under close scrutiny, both in the academy and 
the wider world. The former can be seen in the array of texts, from global history to 
post-colonial scholarship, which examines the interrelationship between the ‘rise of the 
West’ and the ‘decline of the Rest’.1 The latter can be seen in the malaise that infuses 
Western international order, whether this is found in its forums of governance, 
deepening levels of inequality, or in increasingly polarised debates over immigration, 
race, and sexuality. A transnational movement of anti-establishment groups, present in 
much of Europe and North America, is but one barometer of a general atmosphere of 
discontent that permeates Western international order.   
                                                        
1 No footnote can do justice to these prolific fields of activity. I therefore highlight just 
one work that I take to be exemplary of each: on global history, see C.A. Bayly, The Birth 
of the Modern World, 1780-1914 (Oxford, Blackwell, 2004); on post-colonial scholarship, 
see Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2000).  
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It is a brave individual who marches into this landscape arguing that the contemporary 
Western states-system is a singularly civilised order, the inheritor of advances made 
over several centuries. Yet this is the path chosen by Andrew Linklater. His trilogy of 
interventions into the shape and trajectory of modern international order (two books 
published; one to come) is nothing if not ‘untimely’ in that it cuts against the grain of 
trends within contemporary world politics, while simultaneously speaking to an earlier 
tradition of scholarship, one associated with Arnold Toynbee and Oswald Spengler, as 
well as the two figures on which Linklater most heavily draws: Norbert Elias and Martin 
Wight. Much of this untimeliness is welcome – Linklater has written a big book (literally 
as well as figuratively), one that seeks to capture the principal contours of Western 
historical development from ancient Greece to the present day. It is that most 
unfashionable of contemporary academic texts: a grand narrative, so grand as to be 
bordering on the monumental in its scale and ambition. The scholarship that informs 
Violence and Civilisation is deep and erudite, and its argument is arresting. It is a book 
that many will – and should – engage.  
 
My goal in this article is to examine the historical sociology that informs Violence and 
Civilisation – in other words, to assess the form and content of Linklater’s argument 
about historical development. I do so in three sections. First, I evaluate the conceptual, 
analytical and theoretical apparatus on which Linklater’s argument rests, paying 
particular attention to his use of Elias and Wight. My argument is that Linklater’s 
reliance on Elias and Wight generates a number of problems, ranging from the former’s 
concern with fundamental human drives to the latter’s view of culture as unitary and 
bounded. At the same time, Linklater’s fusion of Elias and Wight is unsteady – where the 
former is relational, the latter is substantialist. The result is an unstable theoretical 
scaffolding. The second section explores the historical arguments presented in the book, 
particularly that concerning the ‘when’, ‘where’ and ‘how’ of modern international 
order. On the ‘when’: it was not 15th century Europe but the 19th century ‘global 
transformation’ that fuelled major changes to the character of violence. On the ‘where’: 
these changes emerged not from dynamics internal to Europe, but from transboundary 
interactions. And on the ‘how’: these developments were caused by a range of dynamics, 
particularly capitalism, which receive either little or no attention in Linklater’s book. If 
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the first part of the article questions the theoretical anchors upon which Violence and 
Civilisation rests, the second section queries the book’s historical interpretation. A brief 
conclusion reflects on what should be expected from the next volume of Linklater’s 
‘untimely’ work.  
 
Theorising violence and civilisation 
The central aim of Violence and Civilisation is to ‘analyse the extent to which agreed 
standards of self-restraint that were linked with shared conceptions of civility or 
civilisation have shaped the development of Western states-systems’.2 This is followed 
by a supplementary, if related, question: ‘what is distinctive about “international ethics” 
in the modern period?’3 As with his previous work on harm,4 Linklater seeks to answer 
these questions through a ‘higher level synthesis’ that blends insights from the work of 
Norbert Elias and Martin Wight.5 From Elias comes the book’s principal motif: the 
interplay between civilising (‘integrative’) and decivilising (‘disintegrative’) processes; 
from Wight a focus on how these dynamics take place in international states-systems.6  
 
Linklater argues that there has been a decline in interpersonal violence – and a 
concomitant rise in levels of civility – over several centuries. The key concepts used to 
track this decline are: ‘we-feeling’, by which Linklater means collective attachment to a 
‘survival unit’ (such as the state); ‘we-I balance’, understood as the extent to which 
individual demands are recognised by groups; and ‘social standards of self-restraint’, 
which captures processes ranging from ‘conscience formation’ to ‘collective learning’.7 
For Linklater, contemporary Western societies have a stronger sense of ‘we-feeling’ 
than previous states-systems, a superior ‘we-I’ balance, and a higher ‘standard of self-
restraint’. The ‘preconditions’ for this ethical judiciousness are multiple, ranging from 
                                                        
2 Andrew Linklater, Violence and Civilisation in the Western States-System (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2016), p. xi.  
3 Linklater (2016), p. 2.  
4 Andrew Linklater, The Problem of Harm in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011).  
5 Linklater (2016), p. 5.  
6 A detailed account of Linklater’s synthesis of Elias and Wight can be found in Linklater 
(2011), especially chapter 6.  
7 Linklater (2016), pp. 5, 8, 12.  
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increasing levels of interdependence to a heightened aversion to pain and suffering.8 As 
a result, the contemporary states-system is home to two types of ‘harm convention’: 
‘international harm conventions’, which preserve order between states; and 
‘cosmopolitan harm conventions’, which protect individuals and non-state entities.9 
Examples of the former include practices of non-intervention; examples of the latter 
range from the establishment of a global human rights regime to the development of 
rules surrounding warfare. Linklater tracks the progress of ethical restraints on 
violence from the relatively unfettered environment of the Hellenic states-system to the 
relative ‘taming’ of unnecessary suffering in the contemporary world.10  
 
There are several things to say about the conceptual, analytical and theoretical 
apparatus that Linklater constructs. First, it is not clear that the ‘higher level synthesis’ 
between Elias and Wight is robust. As Linklater notes, Elias is a processual sociologist – 
his principle contribution is the notion of ‘figuration’, a vehicle for moving beyond the 
‘conceptual polarization’ that bifurcates individuals and societies, and the dividing lines 
between an ‘inner self’ and the ‘outside world’.11 For Elias, social orders are made up of 
multiple, overlapping figurations, by which he means networks of relationships, from 
families to states. Elias sees social orders as made up of ‘people among other people’, 
while individuals are ‘one among others’.12 Figurations, Elias argues, are drawn both 
from these relationships (or ‘interdependencies’) and ‘human personality structures’: 
their ‘affect controls’, psychological attachments, forms of recognition, capacities to feel 
shame, guilt, pity, compassion, and so on.13  
 
                                                        
8 Other factors, ranging from the role of ‘monopolies of power’ to ‘incentives for 
cooperation’, drop in and out of the narrative, but are not theorized consistently. I come 
back to this point in the following section.  
9 Linklater (2016), p. xii. 
10 Linklater (2016), p. 12. The qualifications are important. Linklater presents a 
nuanced narrative in which the relationship between civilising and decivilising 
processes is dynamic, and levels of civility do not increase in a straightforward fashion. I 
return to this point below.  
11 Norbert Elias, What is Sociology? (London: Hutchinson, 1978), p. 122. For a more 
recent statement of processual sociology, see: Andrew Abbott, Processual Sociology 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016). 
12 Elias, What is Sociology (1978), pp. 121-2.  
13 Norbert Elias, The Civilising Process (New York: Urizen, 1978), p. 223.  
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This is a long way from Wight’s apparatus, which is concerned with the ways in which a 
common culture is a requirement of an enduring states-system. Wight states this point 
baldly: ‘a state system presupposes a common culture’.14 Far from a figurational 
conceptualisation of interacting relationships, Wight’s international orders contain 
fixed attributes. Chief amongst these fixed attributes is culture, which Wight sees as 
bounded and unitary.15 In other words, while Elias’s theoretical commitments are 
‘relational’, Wight’s are ‘substantialist’.16 The former holds that social formations are 
contextually bound, historically situated configurations of events and experiences. In 
keeping with this orientation, Elias’s figurations are not static entities with timeless 
properties, but ‘on the move’ – they are ‘entities-in-motion’ that are made in and 
through time.17 In contrast, Wight’s position is substantialist. He posits coherent and 
durable entities (states systems) that possess elemental properties (cultural unity). Far 
from seeing these characteristics, or indeed international relations in general, as 
contextual, Wight argues that world politics is a ‘realm of recurrence and repetition’ in 
which progress is, at best, limited.18 In Wight’s world, history is circular rather than, as 
for Elias, directional, or at least dynamic.19 The meta-commitments deployed by Elias 
and Wight could scarcely be more different: where the former is relational, the latter is 
substantialist; where the former sees history as on the move, the latter sees it as 
repetitive; and where the former is concerned with time and place specificity, the latter 
                                                        
14 Martin Wight, Systems of States (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1977), p. 46.  
15 Christian Reus-Smit, ‘Cultural Diversity and International Order’, International 
Organization 71:4 (2017), In Press. For Wight, a common culture is not the only 
requirement of a states-system – other components range from the recognition of 
reciprocal sovereignty to the holding of regular congresses. See Wight (1977), pp. 29-
33. I focus on the centrality of culture to states-systems because it is the feature that 
Linklater and Wight spend most time on. 
16 On the distinction between relational and substantialist thinking, see: Mustafa 
Emirbayer, ‘Manifesto for a Relational Sociology’, American Journal of Sociology 103:2 
(1997): 281-317. For an application to IR, see: Patrick Jackson and Daniel Nexon, 
‘Relations Before States’, European Journal of International Relations 5:3 (1999), pp. 
291-332. 
17 On ‘entities in motion’, see: Julian Go and George Lawson, ‘For a Global Historical 
Sociology’, in Julian Go and George Lawson (eds), Global Historical Sociology 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), pp. 1–34.  
18 Martin Wight, ‘Why is There No International Theory?’, in Herbert Butterfield and 
Martin Wight (eds) (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1966), p. 26. 
19 The extent to which Elias saw history as directional (in the sense of being 
progressive) is contested. See Linklater (2011), p. 162. And more generally: Stephen 
Mennell et al (eds), On the Process of Civilisation (Dublin: UCD Press, 2012).  
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sees states-systems as transhistorical entities that contain timeless properties. Any 
synthesis that joins these meta-commitments must address these incompatibilities.  
 
If the synthesis between Elias and Wight is uncertain, so too is the way in which 
Linklater adopts aspects of their individual theoretical apparatuses. The problems with 
Elias start with issues of scalability. As Linklater notes,20 Elias made few attempts to 
discuss civilising processes beyond state borders. Rather, his interest was in how 
distinct state-society figurations generated distinct understandings of civility – his 
contribution sits firmly within the tradition of comparative rather than international 
historical sociology. Similarly, Elias assumes that the borders of the nation-state both 
map onto the boundaries of the nation-state and form a natural unit of analysis.21 This 
‘methodological nationalism’ means that Elias does not – indeed, cannot – theorise, even 
if he can – and does – describe, the interactions across borders that play a crucial role in 
civilising processes: the emulation of rituals, including manners, from more ‘advanced’ 
peoples, the role of transboundary conflict in developing ideas of just conduct, the 
fusions of cosmologies that regulate behaviour, the role of international non-
governmental organisations in framing ideas of empathy, pity, shame, and more.22 I 
return to this point below.  
 
The second concern with Elias – and, as a result, with Linklater – is the attempt to 
extract explanatory content from ‘psychogenetic’ origins: ‘emotional control’, ‘standards 
of self-restraint’, ‘attitudes to pain and suffering’, and so on.23 As noted above, for 
Linklater, there has been a shift from the ‘aggressive impulses’ that marked historical 
states-systems in the West to the impersonal, ‘mechanized struggle’ of the modern 
world.24 This point is well made. There is something novel about attitudes and practices 
of violence in much of the contemporary West. Violence is no longer primarily 
experienced by many Western publics as immediate, intentional and physical, but often 
hidden from public view by the rise of states and other collective bodies, which 
administer and bureaucratise violence through systems of ‘coercive control’: 
                                                        
20 Linklater (2016), especially chapter 2.  
21 Elias, The Civilising Process (1978).  
22 For a critique of ‘methodological nationalism’, see Go and Lawson (2017). 
23 Linklater (2016), p. 119.  
24 Linklater (2016), pp. 187, 307. The term ‘mechanized struggle’ is from Elias.  
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surveillance, policing, incarceration, and more.25 This, in turn, reflects a changing 
understanding of violence – interpersonal, corporeal violence has been widely 
delegitimised. Non-lethal weapons programmes focus on injuring, depriving, and 
tormenting, but not killing, their enemies.26 ‘Surgical strikes’ seek to sanitise death and 
minimise civilian casualties. Huge anti-war marches speak to far-reaching normative 
debates about the appropriate use of violence. Because of the detachment – what 
Linklater calls ‘critical self-distancing’ – of many people from immediate interpersonal 
violence in the contemporary West, a set of ethical concerns around the practice of 
violence can be said to have emerged.27  
 
Linklater, therefore, is onto something. But it is not clear that he is onto this ‘something’ 
for the right reasons. In particular, claims about international ethics are difficult to link 
to psychogenetic influences. Leaving aside claims about who is the ‘we’ in concepts such 
as the ‘we-I’ balance, much interpersonal conflict takes place within ‘we’ groups, such as 
families. The same is true of ‘we’ groups internationally, whether these groups are 
associated with religions (Sunni and Shia, Catholic and Protestant), regions (consider 
Europe’s many centuries of inter-state wars), or political ideologies (Marxist and 
Anarchist). While it is clear that core attachments and capabilities play a role in how 
individuals perceive and act in the world, it is less clear that these factors significantly 
affect international processes. After all, human beings are, in comparison to other 
animals, not well suited to violence – children are defenceless for many years, while 
adults do not possess the teeth, claws, jaws, horns, venom, speed, smell or eyesight of 
many other animals.28 Rather than being ‘wired for violence’,29 it may be that the 
relative weakness of human’s capacity for violence has prompted their development in 
other spheres, particularly cognition. As with other micro-dynamics, psychogenetic 
factors leave an indeterminate legacy at higher levels of social aggregation.  
 
                                                        
25 Siniša Malešević, The Rise of Organised Brutality (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2017), pp. 311-312. 
26 Malešević (2017), p. 310. 
27 Linklater (2016), p. 280. 
28 Malešević (2017), p. 72. 
29 Steven Pinker, The Better Angels of Our Nature (London: Allen Lane, 2011), p. 483.  
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At the same time, it is not clear that, even with recent declines in interpersonal 
violence,30 the ‘self-restraint’ of bureaucratic violence should be preferred to the more 
direct impulses of pre-modern ‘warriors’. The ‘weapons lethality index’ ranks a longbow 
at 34, an 18th century flintlock musket at 150, a First World War rifle at 13,000, and a 
Second World War machine gun at 68,000.31 On this scale, an 18th century 12 pounder 
field gun ranks 4,000, a modern howitzer 3,500,000, a heavy bomber with conventional 
weapons 210,000,000, and an ICBM with a one megaton nuclear warhead 
210,000,000,000. As interpersonal violence has declined in some parts of the world, 
weapons have become increasingly destructive. And the self-distancing that 
accompanies these weapons has generated a new rationality of killing, from the air 
campaigns against major cities in World War Two to contemporary drone warfare, 
robotics and precision targeting.  
 
At times, as Linklater notes, the destructive power of modern weapons has led to their 
containment – agreements over chemical, biological and nuclear weapons are cases in 
point.32 But the 20th century was the bloodiest in human history – its casualties from 
war and associated processes can be measured in the hundreds of millions.33 It was also 
the century that saw a major increase in the speed of killing. In the Battle of the Somme 
during World War One, over 50,000 British soldiers lost their lives in a single day. By 
the latter stages of World War Two, the Nazi killing machine at Auschwitz had the 
capacity to gas and cremate over 20,000 Jews every day.34 In the early part of the 21st 
century, up to one million Rwandans were killed in a genocide that lasted only 100 days. 
Today’s weapons of mass destruction make the spectre of a global ‘elimination contest’ 
immediate – the organisational and technological capacity for violence has never been 
greater.35 It is worth remembering that the two largest employers in the world are the 
                                                        
30 An attempt to provide empirical ballast for this claim can be found in Pinker (2011). 
For an argument that declining levels of violence are much more recent and limited 
than Pinker suggests, see: Malešević (2017), pp. 132-141. 
31 Julian Perry Robinson, ‘The Neutron Bomb and Conventional Weapons of Mass 
Destruction’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 34:March (1978): pp. 42-45. 
32 Linklater (2016), p. 459 
33 Malešević (2017), pp. 6, 127. 
34 Malešević (2017), pp. 128-129. 
35 Linklater uses the term ‘elimination contest’ frequently. It is one he borrows from 
Elias. 
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US Defence Department and the Chinese People’s Liberation Army.36 The threat of 
global annihilation is ever present, if made distant from everyday life through 
bureaucratic rationality, technologies of war, and a detachment between operator and 
target. I come back to this point in the following section.  
 
Similarly, a ‘pacified’ environment is not one that necessarily denotes civilising 
processes.37 Elias saw stable monopolies of power as central to security and, thereby, to 
civilising processes. Linklater extends this point to the international realm. Given that 
civilising processes might, at times, require contestation (in the form of just war and 
just revolt, or through the actions of social movements), it is not clear how much 
stability is required for there to be a balance between security and civilisational 
processes. It is similarly unclear what happens when security trumps civilising 
processes. Very often, stability comes at a price. In the 20th century, authoritarian 
regimes from apartheid South Africa to the Khmer Rouge used their monopolies of force 
to commit egregious acts of violence. Such policies had their roots in 19th century 
‘invasions of social life’, in which states sought to extend their control over populations 
through a range of measures, ranging from the advent of policing as a formal institution 
to regular censuses.38 The despotic capabilities of states grew commensurately with 
these encroachments. In Britain, those out of work were forced into workhouses, where 
they were kept in abject conditions and paid a pittance for their labour. Orphanages and 
prisons became additional sources of bonded labour. Disciplinary forms of power, from 
surveillance to incarceration, have undergone a major expansion in recent decades. All 
around the world, there has been a coercive pacification of domestic publics – not for 
nothing did Charles Tilly call modern states ‘protection rackets’.39 These histories have 
little place in Linklater’s account. Yet it is not possible to tell a story of power 
monopolies without them.  
 
                                                        
36 Malešević (2017), p. 139.  
37 Linklater (2016), p. 187.  
38 Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990-1992 (Oxford: Blackwell. 
Tilly, 1990), p. 23. 
39 Charles Tilly, ‘War Making and State Making as Organized Crime’ in Peter Evans et al 
(eds), Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 
169-191. 
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The third issue with the conceptual and analytical tools that Linklater appropriates 
from Elias is the latter’s focus on court society as the repository of civility.40 For Elias, 
civility is rooted in the discourses, practices and sociability of court society.41 So it is for 
Linklater – in Violence and Civilisation, psychogenetic changes take place within a ‘ruling 
strata’ before being internalised by the wider population.42 This view limits historical 
agency to elite, white, European men. It is not a convincing argument. If the supposed 
source for this agency lies in the patrimonial orders that were common features of the 
Western states system, it ignores the central role played by elite women in sustaining 
these orders.43 Beyond elites, it omits the ways in which publics have played a central 
role in civilising processes, whether through radical action or by initiating reform 
processes. History does not flow in one direction, whether from men to women, or from 
elites to mass publics.  
 
Nor does history flow from ‘the West’ to ‘the Rest’. Linklater largely replicates early 
English School accounts of the expansion of international society,44 arguing that the 
Western states-system diffused from Europe to other parts of the world. But history 
presents a much messier picture of incorporation and adaptation.45 In their interactions 
with European polities, the Ottomans and Chinese thought of themselves as the 
culturally and politically superior party. In Africa and the Americas, Europeans engaged 
in diplomacy and made treaties with local peoples, chiefdoms and kingdoms. When they 
moved into the Indian Ocean, the Europeans found a well-developed international 
society in place.46 Grotius’ 17th century argument that Europeans should accept the 
principle that the high seas constituted international territory was based on the 
                                                        
40 Norbert Elias, The Court Society (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 1985).  
41 Elias, Civilising Process (1978); Elias (1985).  
42 Linklater (2016), p. 119.  
43 Julia Adams, The Familial State (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007).  
44 Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (eds) The Expansion of International Society (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1984). Also see Linklater (2011), p. 24.  
45 Edward Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002); Shogo Suzuki, Civilization and Empire (London: Routledge, 2009); Ayşe 
Zarakol, After Defeat (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Paul MacDonald, 
Networks of Domination (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); Andrew Phillips and 
Jason Sharman, Explaining Durable Diversity in International Systems (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2015); Barry Buzan and George Lawson, The Global 
Transformation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).  
46 Phillips and Sharman (2015). 
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precedent provided by the Indian Ocean states-system,47 just as trade between Britain 
and India helped to form Adam Smith’s ideas about free trade,48 and utilitarian thought 
was forged in the imperial encounters between Britain and the sub-continent.49 Any 
narrative of Western civilizational resources diffusing outwards misses the back-and-
forth of these interactions, and the ways in which they spurred historical development. 
History is not unidirectional, but an interactive series of events and experiences that 
generate multilinear developmental pathways.50 
 
The problems with Linklater’s use of Wight are also multiple, if stemming from a 
common cause: the requirement that international orders contain a high degree of 
cultural unity. Linklater accepts Wight’s notion that states-systems can be understood 
as a ‘bounded cultural region’.51 However, culture is not a coherent whole that is unified 
and bounded, but a diverse web of symbols and rituals that are negotiated, contested 
and subject to diverse interpretations.52 International orders regulate cultural diversity 
by authorising forms of cultural difference and tying these to political units: states and 
religion, empires and civilisation, etc.53 In other words, cultural heterogeneity is not the 
mark of an unsuccessful international order, but a requirement of international order. 
Given this, it is no surprise that many of the most durable historical international orders 
have been culturally plural and geographically dispersed. The British imperial web, for 
example, encompassed China, Argentina, Fiji, Australia, Afghanistan, India, Egypt, 
Nigeria, Cyprus and Ireland. This scattered geography was not maintained through the 
enforcement of cultural similitude, but through symbolic amalgams that regulated 
unequal recognition. The legal structure of the British Empire was a layered, ‘lumpy’ 
                                                        
47 C.H. Alexandrowicz, C.H., An Introduction to the History of the Law of Nations in the 
East Indies (Oxford: Clarendon, 1967). 
48 Emily Erikson, ‘The Global Origins of Economic Theory’, in Julian Go and George 
Lawson (eds), Global Historical Sociology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2017), pp. 182–198. 
49 Partha Chatterjee, The Black Hole of Empire (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2012). 
50 Justin Rosenberg, ‘Why is there No International Historical Sociology’, European 
Journal of International Relations 12:3 (2006): 307-340. 
51 Linklater (2016), p. 468. 
52 Reus-Smit (2017). Also see: Ann Swidler, ‘Culture in Action’, American Sociological 
Review 51:2 (1986): 273-286.  
53 Reus-Smit (2017). 
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fusion of imperial and indigenous.54 The penal code of the Raj blended British and 
Indian jurisprudence, and it was this blend that was exported to many of Britain’s 
imperial territories in South East Asia and East Africa.55 Where British imperialism was 
successful, it relied on establishing close partnerships with local power brokers: the 
Straits Chinese, the Krio of West Africa, the ‘teak-wallahs’ of Burma, the Chettiar of 
South India, and others.56  
 
Although some Victorians favoured an Anglo-American alliance premised on cultural 
homogeneity, largely as a vehicle for maintaining white supremacy,57 it was not shared 
culture, but a collective belief that it paid to make the system work (what Adam Watson 
calls ‘raison de système’) that served as the building block of modern international 
order.58 The development of human rights, something central to Linklater’s argument, 
serves as an illustration. Contrary to Linklater’s claims, the contemporary human rights 
regime is not a Western invention that has been subsequently exported around the 
world, but the product of negotiations between northern and southern states in which 
histories of race and decolonisation have played leading roles.59 In the contemporary 
world, it is the pluralist promise of the G20 and related institutions, not ideas such as 
the ‘Concert of Democracies’, a notion emanating from a commitment to Western 
cultural homogeneity, which provide the surest prospects of generating enduring 
order.60  
 
                                                        
54 Lauren Benton, A Search for Sovereignty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2010), p. 8. 
55 Thomas R. Metcalf, Imperial Connections (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2007), pp. 19, 32. 
56 John Darwin, Unfinished Empire (London: Allen Lane, 2012). 
57 Duncan Bell, The Idea of Greater Britain (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
2007); Duncan Bell, ‘The Project for a New Anglo Century: Race, Space and Global 
Order’, in Peter Katzenstein (ed), Anglo-America and Its Discontents (London: Routledge, 
2012), pp. 33-56. 
58 Adam Watson, The Evolution of International Society (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 14. 
59 Steven L.G. Jensen, The Making of International Human Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2016).  
60 Barry Buzan and George Lawson, ‘Capitalism and the Emergent World Order’, 
International Affairs, 90:1 (2014): 71-91. At one point, Linklater (2016, p. 435) refers to 
contemporary global order as ‘multicultural’. However, multiculturalism rests on a 
foundation of bounded, co-existing cultural units rather than a notion of culture as a 
messy amalgam of diverse influences. 
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The ‘when’, ‘where’ and ‘how’ of modern international order 
If the theoretical foundations of Violence and Civilisation are insecure, so too are the 
book’s historical arguments. Implicit in Linklater’s historical narrative are three 
commitments. The first is temporal: that there is a disjuncture between ‘modern’ and 
‘pre-modern’ eras when it comes to levels of civility and violence. The second is spatial: 
that there is something distinctive about Western states-systems and their development 
of harm conventions. The third is causal: that the primary dynamic that lies behind 
decreasing levels of interpersonal violence is self-restraint and its relationship to 
broader social forces, particularly increasing levels of interdependence. All three 
assumptions are questionable. 
 
When 
For Linklater, each states system varies in its civility quotient. In the Hellenic states-
system, despite relatively low civility metrics, hoplites practiced ‘aristocratic principles 
of restraint’.61 In the contemporary world, despite high levels of we-feeling and 
standards of self-restraint, civilising processes represent an ‘unfinished transition’.62 
Notwithstanding these qualifications, Violence and Civilisation contains a central 
narrative in which the Western states-systems has travelled from a predominantly 
decivilised past to a predominantly civilised present, a journey, as Linklater puts it, from 
‘taming the warriors’ to ‘taming the imperialists’ and, more recently, ‘taming the 
sovereigns’.63 Linklater argues, following Wight and Elias, that the key rupture within 
the ‘long curve of European social and political development’ took place in the fifteenth 
century.64 Although, for Linklater, there is an initial break around 1300CE from 
disintegrated, decivilising societies to interconnected polities that begin to restrain 
violence,65 it is Renaissance Italy that witnessed ‘a revolution in the history of the 
Western states-system that would alter the whole course of human development’. 
                                                        
61 Linklater (2016), p. 55. 
62 Linklater (2016), pp. 440, 447.  
63 Linklater (2016), p. 305. 
64 Linklater (2016), p. 188. For Wight, the key event is the Council of Constance, 1414-
18; for Elias it is the gradual shift to individual self-control represented by the spread of 
ideas such as politesse, civilité and courtoisie. See: Wight (1977), p. 151; Elias, Civilising 
Process (1978), pp. 39, 62, 102. 
65 Linklater (2016), p. 109.  
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‘Modern standpoints on violence and civilisation’, Linklater writes, ‘first emerged in the 
Italian city-state system’.66 
 
The problem is that modern international order did not emerge in 15th century Italy. 
For many centuries after this, life for most Europeans remained brutish and short, while 
levels of interdependence were minimal. Although commodity chains established long-
distance trading networks in luxury goods that connected entrepôts such as Malacca, 
Samarkand, Hangzhou, Genoa and the Malabar Coast, the vast majority of economic 
activities took part in ‘microeconomies’ with a 20-mile circumference until well into the 
19th century.67 It was the revolutions in interaction capacity generated by the railways, 
steamships and telegraph that brought the world into some kind of global commons. 
Although this process had long-roots and multiple points of origin, it was only during 
the 19th century that a cluster of deep changes occurred together, on a global scale, and 
within a relatively short time-span.68 Similarly, it is difficult to see how psychogenetic 
processes could have spread very far without mass travel or widespread media, 
developments that, once again, are found most prominently in the 19th century. It was 
during this period that industrial capitalism, imperialism, state formation and novel 
political ideologies fashioned a world that was deeply interdependent. They also 
fashioned a world in which what Linklater calls ‘incentives to cooperate’ were sharply 
intensified by rapid, permanent advances in military technologies.69  
 
Linklater’s narrative also has a hard time explaining the intensification of decivilising 
processes during the 20th century. Although he spends a chapter on the Holocaust, and 
does discuss the dark side of imperialism, Violence and Civilisation reads like a game of 
snakes and ladders in which the game is rigged: the ladders (the climb towards global 
civility) are always more powerful, and more pronounced, than the snakes (the slide to 
decivility). Yet, as noted in the previous section, the scale of decivilising processes over 
the past two centuries takes some explaining. The casualty list of 19th century 
                                                        
66 Linklater (2016), p. 184. 
67 Herman Schwartz, States and Markets (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 2000), p. 14. 
68 Barry Buzan and George Lawson, ‘Theory, History, and the Global Transformation’, 
International Theory 8:3 (2017), pp. 502-522. 
69 Buzan and Lawson (2015): chapter 8. 
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imperialism numbered tens of millions.70 The Japanese attempt to be accepted as racial 
equals at Versailles was rejected by Western powers, perhaps unsurprisingly: the 
British empire still encompassed more than 30 million square miles of territory in the 
1930s. During the 1950s, the French fought a bloody campaign to ‘keep Algeria French’, 
while the Mau Mau Rebellion in Kenya during the same decade stands as one of the 
more vicious episodes in British imperial history. Over twenty million people died in 
conflicts during the Cold War,71 a period Linklater associates with the ‘taming of great 
power rivalries’.72 If the first decade of the post-Cold War world were marked by 
genocide and war, the opening years of the 21st century have been even less hospitable 
to standards of self-restraint. Massacres, terrorism, expulsions and the mass movement 
of refugees are depressingly familiar features of world politics. It is difficult to see how 
these processes can be squared with Linklater’s core dynamics: an ‘expanding circle’ of 
moral concern,73 an increasing identification with the suffering of distant strangers, and 
a shift towards universal humanity,74 let alone with his claim that ‘larger social webs 
have encouraged the dampening of aggressive impulses’.75 Perhaps people’s capacity for 
‘collective learning’ has seen them learn the wrong lessons, or simply learn how to kill 
and torture each other more effectively.   
 
The directionality that lies behind Linklater’s historical sweep also induces misreadings 
of landmark events. One example is the abolition of the Atlantic slave trade, which 
Linklater sees as ‘one of the more remarkable examples of “moral progress”’.76 Despite 
the abolition of the slave trade during the early years of the 19th century, and slavery 
more generally during the middle part of the century, slavery remained a core 
component of the Atlantic economy until the latter part of the 19th century. During the 
19th century as a whole, an estimated 3.3 million African slaves were transported from 
                                                        
70 Jürgen Osterhammel, The Transformation of the World, Translated by Partick Camiller 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), pp. 124-127. 
71 Fred Halliday, ‘Third World Socialism: 1989 and After’, in George Lawson, Chris 
Armbruster and Michael Cox (eds), The Global 1989 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010), p. 116. 
72 Linklater (2016). p. 438. 
73 Linklater (2011), p. 25. 
74 Linklater (2016), pp. 265, 291. 
75 Linklater (2011), p. 174. 
76 Linklater (2016), p. 265. 
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Africa to the Americas.77 Abolition was accompanied by a marked increase in the 
numbers of both bonded labourers and transported convicts. Britain’s Asian convicts 
were transported to penal colonies in the Indian Ocean (such as the Andaman Islands, 
Penang and Singapore) where they were put to work felling timber and draining 
swamps in brutal conditions.78 These histories make it difficult to see the abolition of 
the slave trade as an illustration of how ‘the social gradient between Europe and other 
peoples became less steep because of increased support for the idea of human 
equality’.79  It is even more difficult to justify these claims in a narrative that associates 
abolition almost entirely with Western reformers, and only marginally with the slave 
revolts that shook the Atlantic world during the late 18th and early 19th centuries.80 
Here, as in other places, Linklater’s theoretical commitments prompt questionable 
historical interpretations.  
 
The wider problem facing Linklater’s historical narrative stems from the duality he 
maintains between civilising and decivilising processes, which he likens to a ‘Janus-
faced’ process that promotes justice within the ‘civilised’ realm, and force outside it.81 
However, the ‘barbarians’ in the Roman states-system were not just ‘others’ whose 
influence stopped at the gates, but ‘insiders’ whose influence spread within the gates.82 
‘Small wars’ in Ethiopia, Algeria and Vietnam were deeply generative of historical 
trajectories in the core.83 Or to take an example closer to Linklater’s core narrative – his 
analysis of human rights, like his account of abolition, rests entirely on elite Western 
agency. There is no mention of Hansa Mehta, the Indian delegate on the UN Human 
Rights Commission, who was responsible for the text of the Covenant reading as ‘all 
human beings are created equal’ rather than ‘all men are created equal’. Nor is there 
space for the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), with its 
                                                        
77 Bayly (2004), p. 403.  
78 Claire Anderson, Convicts in the Indian Ocean (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 2000).  
79 Linklater (2016), p. 265. 
80 David Armitage and Sanjay Subrahmanyan (eds), The Age of Revolutions in Global 
Context (Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2010).  
81 Linklater (2016), p. 127. Also see: Wight (1977), p. 128. 
82 An excerpt from Constandine Cadavy’s ‘Waiting for the Barbarians’ makes the point 
well: ‘The barbarians are coming today. What laws can the senators make now? Once 
the barbarians are here, they’ll do the legislating’. Quite often, they did.  
83 Tarak Barkawi, ‘On the Pedagogy of Small Wars’, International Affairs 80:1 (2004), pp. 
19-37.  
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50,000 members from 40 countries and two Nobel Prize winners (Jane Addams and 
Emily Greene Balch), despite its centrality to the emergence of campaigns for human 
rights and social justice. As discussed in the previous section, and as I return to below, 
the substantialist commitments that Linklater adopts from Wight run-up against the 
processual interplay between people and groups that Elias endorsed, and that in large 
measure drive historical development.  
 
Where  
Linklater’s account of international states-system draws far more heavily on Wight than 
Elias – as such it is resolutely substantialist. For Linklater, as for Wight, the fundamental 
shape of states-systems is bounded, and their fundamental logic is dualistic: a realm of 
self-restraint and we-feeling inside, a realm of force and violence outside. The 
procedure for examining what makes Western states-systems Western is, for both 
Linklater and Wight, a comparison, either explicit or implicit, with ‘other’ cultural blocs. 
Wight’s comparative method sought to establish both the importance of cultural unity 
to states-systems (as in his discussion of ancient China, the Greco-Roman system, and 
the modern West) and the ways in which the absence of a common culture contributed 
to failures to establish enduring states-systems (as in Persia, Carthage, and 
elsewhere).84 Violence and Civilisation follows a similar path. First, Linklater takes the 
West, a cultural unit he sees as historically identifiable over many centuries, as his 
definitive unit of analysis. Second, he outlines a historical narrative that takes place via 
dynamics both within this integrated, bounded cultural unit (e.g. increasing expressions 
of self-restraint) and through differentiation with those outside the cultural unit (e.g. 
‘barbarians’).  
 
However, as discussed in the previous section, civilisations are the products rather than 
the producers of cultural flows – they are ‘hybrid amalgams’ rather than ‘self-
constituting entities’.85 These hybrid amalgams encompass a promiscuous array of 
                                                        
84 Wight (1977). Also see: Martin Wight, ‘Western Values in International Relations’, in 
Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight (eds), Diplomatic Investigations (London: George 
Allen and Unwin, 1966): pp. 89–131.  
85 John Hobson, ‘Worlding the Rise of Capitalism’, in Julian Go and George Lawson (eds), 
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ideas, inventions and institutions, from cosmologies to productive techniques.86 Major 
religions do not just cross borders, but are constituted in novel blends of indigenous 
and transnational; technologies and strategies of warfare are emulated and fused with 
existing capacities; cartographic techniques used to map colonial spaces serve as the 
basis for territorial claims within metropoles.87 In other words, history is not Western 
first and ‘other’ second; it is global all the way down. Any narrative that focuses on a 
dualistic logic between inside and outside cannot tell the story of the West any more 
than it can tell the history of any other part of the world. To take one prominent 
example: British industrialisation is necessarily conjoined with the de-industrialisation 
of India. After 1800, the British government ensured that British products undercut 
Indian goods and charged prohibitive tariffs on Indian textiles. By 1820, British 
products were being exported in bulk to the subcontinent. By 1850, Lancashire was the 
centre of a global textile industry, reversing centuries of subcontinental pre-eminence 
in this area.88  
 
Given the ways in which these dynamics are generative of the historical developments 
that Linklater examines, it makes more sense to see civilisations as constituted by 
transboundary encounters rather than as bounded units that subsequently interact with 
other blocs. In each part of Linklater’s account, civilisations are taken to be bounded 
units of analysis – he proceeds from unit to interactions. But this is the wrong way 
around. A processual sociology should run from interactions to units.89  
 
How  
While the explanandum of Linklater’s analysis is clear (an increase in civility within the 
Western, now global, states-system), the explanans in his account is less so. Partly this 
confusion arises from fuzzy language. Linklater writes that there is an ‘interrelationship’ 
                                                                                                                                                                            
240. Also see Peter Katzenstein ed., Civilizations in World Politics (London: Routledge, 
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between psychogenetic processes and broader social forces, but the status of this 
interrelationship is unspecified. I noted above that a wide range of factors, from ‘reality-
congruent knowledge’ to ‘incentives for cooperation’,90 drop in and out of Violence and 
Civilisation without being consistently applied or theorized. Nor is it clear how the 
‘conveyor belt’ from the ancient to the modern worlds operates.91 Linklater draws a 
line, albeit a jumpy one, from the past to the present. His is a stadial account, which 
begins with the ‘simpler civilisations’ of the Greeks and Romans,92 with their limited 
attention to international ethics, through to Latin Christendom in which violence and 
cruelty are widespread, but that also witness a ‘civilisational offensive’ and ‘a religiously 
inspired quest to tame the warriors’,93 to the emergence in the Renaissance of a 
sustained commitment to care, restraint and non-violent dispute resolution.94 But how 
exactly were standards of self-restraint carried from one era to another? For Linklater, 
the answer appears to be (broadly) humanist tracts:95 the book spends considerable 
time on publications by Cicero, Seneca, Erasmus, Raynal, Kant, and like-minded figures. 
Ideas such as ‘virtus’ (‘the moral expression of manly virtue’) are seen as the carriers of 
civility,96 working to ‘tame warrior impulses’.97 But how did these figures and their 
publications infuse wider publics with self-restraint and we-feeling? And what is the 
relationship between their work and wider causal factors, such as interdependence? 
 
This issue is not helped by the interchangeable way in which Linklater treats terms such 
as interdependence and interconnection. These are not the same thing. The latter 
describes points of connection, as with those provided by a train line, telephone or 
diaspora. The former is a stronger claim, denoting mutual (if asymmetrical) 
dependence. Take the example of the failure of the British bank Barings in 1889, one of 
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the largest investment houses in the world, following its failure to sell a large issue of 
Argentinian bonds. When, the following year, the Argentinian government defaulted, 
Barings’ holdings became worthless. The subsequent ‘panic’ meant that capital flows to 
Argentina all but ceased for five years. Here an event in one sphere of activity (banking) 
in one part of the world (Britain) caused a general crisis (a depression) in another part 
of the world (Argentina). No wonder that the great student of banking, Norman Angell, 
was keen to stress the interdependencies that banking generated.98 So too did Karl 
Marx, albeit in an altogether more critical register.99  
 
The lack of conceptual clarity between interconnection and interdependence speaks to 
a surprising – and crucial – absence in Linklater’s book: capitalism. The word 
‘capitalism’ appears twice in the main body of the text, neither time in an analytical or 
explanatory sense. Related terms, such as commerce or market, appear more often, but 
again, without forming part of the book’s causal apparatus or analytical schema. In fact, 
commerce is seen mainly as a form of restraint,100 something that would be news to 
most observers of the practices of new world plantation owners, late 19th century 
robber barons, and early 21st century financiers. Given Linklater’s previous interest in 
Marx,101 as well as the return of broadly Marxian themes in recent tracts by Thomas 
Piketty and Branko Milanovic,102 Marx’s absence from Violence and Civilisation is 
surprising. A deeper engagement with this tradition would have bolstered the book’s 
theoretical resources by offering alternative segues into relational, perhaps even 
dialectical, thinking. Substantively, they would have linked Linklater’s interest in global 
ethics with issues of inequality, exploitation and dispossession, issues that are central to 
many of the dynamics that underpin both integrative and disintegrative processes in the 
contemporary world.   
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The untimely historical sociologist 
In an essay written almost 100 years ago, the South Asian writer, B. K. Sarkar critiqued 
the ways in which Western writers essentialised India.103 Sarkar turned the gaze of the 
West back on itself, using a reading of the Iliad to ‘Occidentalise’ the Europeans as 
‘fractious; immoral; licentious; polygamous; in thrall to despotic government and the 
rule of tyrants.’ Writing a few years earlier, Okakura Kakuzō, a prominent Japanese 
scholar, wrote of Western civilisation: ‘In the days when Japan was engaging in peaceful 
acts, the West used to think of it as an uncivilized country. Since Japan started 
massacring thousands of people in the battlefields of Manchuria, the West has called it a 
civilized country’.104 For many people around the world, both a century ago and now, 
Western civilisation stands not for ‘self-restraint’ and ‘emotional control’, but for 
violence and cultural debasement.  
 
How much has changed since Sarkar’s essay and Kakuzō’s book? Linklater’s long-term 
project to foster a more just, empathetic global order is one that many people will 
support. And he is right to point to the many dynamics that support this vision in the 
contemporary world: the depersonalisation of violence in many parts of the West, the 
legal structures and resolution mechanisms that often foster restraint, and heightened 
reflection about ethical responsibilities towards collective violence. However, in 
explaining how we got here, Violence and Civilisation works back from the present day 
to a pre-ordained point of origin, retroactively feeding the ingredients of today’s world 
into the past. This serves to make history closed rather than open-ended, pre-
determined rather than contingent, and linear rather than multilinear. At the same time, 
the principal cast-list of Violence and Civilisation is made up of a handful of elite, white, 
European men who exemplify a ‘cosmopolitan ethos’.105 The book has little place for 
labour movements, suffragettes, anti-colonial thinkers, slaves or serfs. The result of this 
narrow vision is that the dynamics Linklater rightly stresses end up being less 
important than the thematics and histories that are omitted from, or marginalised in, 
the book. The main thematic that is lost is the notion of history as relational, driven by 
interactions between peoples. When it comes to lost histories, both movements from 
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below and transnational connections receive short shrift. This article has sought to 
explain why these omissions matter.  
 
The question to come is whether these lost, or at least minimised, thematics and 
histories will be recovered in the third volume of Linklater’s trilogy. What is clear is that 
it will not be enough for Linklater to extend his historical purview beyond the West 
while retaining a substantialist view of culture and civilising processes, and an 
internalist approach to Western historical development. No convincing historical 
sociology of global historical development can be constructed as ‘West first, then global’, 
just as no such enterprise can proceed from the standpoint of bounded units defined by 
the cultural attributes they share, or lack. If these commitments are retained in 
Linklater’s next volume, the result is likely to be more of the same, except with an ‘add 
and stir’ spice of diffusion, emulation and imitation thrown into the mix. This would be a 
shame. Because if it does come to pass, Linklater’s trilogy is likely to stand as an 
‘untimely’ reminder of a historical sociology whose time has come – and gone.  
 
 
